Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Fernanda A. Ferreira (author)
Other Authors: Flávio Ferreira (author), Miguel Ferreira (author), Alberto A. Pinto (author)
Format: book
Language:eng
Published: 2009
Subjects:
Online Access:https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/handle/10216/91369
Country:Portugal
Oai:oai:repositorio-aberto.up.pt:10216/91369