Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
We consider discounted repeated two-person zero-sum games with private monitoring. We show that even when players have different and time-varying discount factors, each player’s payoff is equal to his stage-game minmax payoff in every sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that: (a) in every h...
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| Formato: | article |
| Idioma: | eng |
| Publicado em: |
2016
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| Texto completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10071/12204 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Oai: | oai:repositorio.iscte-iul.pt:10071/12204 |