Quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Ferreira, Fernanda A. (author)
Outros Autores: Ferreira, Flávio (author), Ferreira, Miguel (author), Pinto, Alberto A. (author)
Formato: bookPart
Idioma:eng
Publicado em: 2016
Texto completo:http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/7359
País:Portugal
Oai:oai:recipp.ipp.pt:10400.22/7359