Price-setting dynamical duopoly with incomplete information
We consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F 1) that chooses first the price p 1 of its good; the other firm (F 2) observes p 1 and then chooses the price p 2 of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duopol...
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| Outros Autores: | , |
| Formato: | bookPart |
| Idioma: | eng |
| Publicado em: |
2016
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| Assuntos: | |
| Texto completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/7299 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Oai: | oai:recipp.ipp.pt:10400.22/7299 |