Equilibria of quantity setting differentiated duopoly with uncertainty
In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods and with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the output levels of their products according to the well-known concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There is a firm ( F1 ) that chooses first the quant...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Outros Autores: | , |
| Formato: | conferenceObject |
| Idioma: | eng |
| Publicado em: |
2015
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| Assuntos: | |
| Texto completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/6662 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Oai: | oai:recipp.ipp.pt:10400.22/6662 |