Effectiveness of monitoring, managerial entrenchment, and corporate cash holdings

We develop a dynamic model of a firm in which cash management is partially delegated to a self-interested manager. Shareholders trade off the cost of dismissing the manager with the cost of managerial discretion over the use of liquid funds. An improvement in corporate governance quality may have a...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Couzoff, Panagiotis (author)
Other Authors: Banerjee, Shantanu (author), Pawlina, Grzegorz (author)
Format: article
Language:eng
Published: 2022
Subjects:
Agency problem
Cash management
Corporate governance
Payout policy
Risk management
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/39120
Country:Portugal
Oai:oai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/39120

Internet

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/39120

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