The role of social and technical excludability for the success of impure public good and common pool agreements

We argue that international fisheries are a prime example to study the incentive structure of forming impure public good and common pool agreements. We consider a fully integrated multiple zone model, in which zones are linked through density-dependent migration. The incentive to accede to Regional...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Finus, Michael (author)
Outros Autores: Schneider, Raoul (author), Pintassilgo, Pedro (author)
Formato: article
Idioma:eng
Publicado em: 2020
Assuntos:
Pure and impure public goods and common pool resourcesTechnical and socially constructed non-excludabilityBenefit-cost duality of public goods and common pool resources
Technical and socially constructed non-excludability
Benefit-cost duality of public goods and common pool resources
Property rights
Shared fish stocks
Regional fisheries management organizations
Free-riding
Texto completo:http://hdl.handle.net/10400.1/13706
País:Portugal
Oai:oai:sapientia.ualg.pt:10400.1/13706

Texto Completo

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.1/13706

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