Price-Setting Dynamical Duopoly with Incomplete Information
We consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F-1) that chooses first the price p(1) of its good; the other firm (F-2) observes p(1) and then chooses the price p(2) of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duo...
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| Outros Autores: | , |
| Formato: | book |
| Idioma: | eng |
| Publicado em: |
2011
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| Assuntos: | |
| Texto completo: | https://hdl.handle.net/10216/100759 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Oai: | oai:repositorio-aberto.up.pt:10216/100759 |