Corporate governance role in mergers and acquisitions

This research aimed to fill a gap in the literature by analysing the influence Corporate Governance has on the operational performance of firms that go through a Merger and acquisition process, measured by ROA and ROE. The objects of our research are 286 deals from 2008 to 2016 and we analyse a time...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Santos, João Nuno Portugal Frota Rodrigues dos (author)
Format: masterThesis
Language:eng
Published: 2022
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10071/24967
Country:Portugal
Oai:oai:repositorio.iscte-iul.pt:10071/24967
Description
Summary:This research aimed to fill a gap in the literature by analysing the influence Corporate Governance has on the operational performance of firms that go through a Merger and acquisition process, measured by ROA and ROE. The objects of our research are 286 deals from 2008 to 2016 and we analyse a time period from one year pre-merger to five years post-merger. Using the comparison of means T-test, we conclude that the mean operational performance decreases in the post-merger period compared to the pre-merger one, while the Corporate Governance Score has a significant increase. By the regression analysis performed we could detect significant and positive relationship between Corporate governance and the profitability of firms (ROA) for the pre-merger year of study and for the year of study, while more independent and the higher the percentage of non-executive members on the board positively relate to better ROA, on the year of the merger and the 3rd year post-merger. We could barely detect any significant relationship between the variables and ROE, as the assumptions of the analysis would not be met for most periods. Yet, we found it is positively influenced by the Corporate Governance Score, Firms that diversified their business (Diversification strategy) and by firms with higher percentage of non-executive board members. Corporate Governance is positively related to the average attendance to board meetings, the average board tenure, and to firms with higher percentage of independent and non-executive board members, being negatively related to boards where the chairman is also the CEO.