A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels
It is well-known that in the wallet game with two bidders, bidding twice the (individual) signal is an equilibrium. We prove that this strategy is never an equilibrium in a Japanese–English auction once discrete bid levels are introduced; we also discuss the implications of this result.
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| Format: | article |
| Language: | eng |
| Published: |
2018
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/25150 |
| Country: | Portugal |
| Oai: | oai:repositorio.ucp.pt:10400.14/25150 |
| Summary: | It is well-known that in the wallet game with two bidders, bidding twice the (individual) signal is an equilibrium. We prove that this strategy is never an equilibrium in a Japanese–English auction once discrete bid levels are introduced; we also discuss the implications of this result. |
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