Endogenous timing of moves in an asymmetric price-setting duopoly
This paper adds to the growing literature on endogenous timing of de- cisions in duopolies. We show for a price-setting duopoly game with sufficiently asymmetric and strictly convex cost functions that the less efficient firm moves first while the more efficient moves second with a higher price than...
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| Formato: | article |
| Idioma: | eng |
| Publicado em: |
2018
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| Texto completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15469 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Oai: | oai:www.repository.utl.pt:10400.5/15469 |
| Resumo: | This paper adds to the growing literature on endogenous timing of de- cisions in duopolies. We show for a price-setting duopoly game with sufficiently asymmetric and strictly convex cost functions that the less efficient firm moves first while the more efficient moves second with a higher price than the less efficient firm. |
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