Privatization and subsidization in a quantity-price-setting leadership duopoly
This paper considers mixed and privatized duopoly competition in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm acts as leader and sets the price while a follower profit-maximizing private firm sets production output. The main propose of the paper is to present and compare the equilibrium outcomes...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | conferenceObject |
| Language: | eng |
| Published: |
2019
|
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/14471 |
| Country: | Portugal |
| Oai: | oai:recipp.ipp.pt:10400.22/14471 |
| Summary: | This paper considers mixed and privatized duopoly competition in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm acts as leader and sets the price while a follower profit-maximizing private firm sets production output. The main propose of the paper is to present and compare the equilibrium outcomes in the two duopoly models, when the government subsidies or not the production. |
|---|