A game-theoretic approach to the socialization of utility-based agents
This paper presents a formal framework in which to study the socialization processes evolving among utility-based agents. These agents are self-interested, being their different social attitudes (cooperativeness, competitiveness or indifference) a consequence of this behavior. The dynamics of the so...
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| Format: | conferencePaper |
| Language: | eng |
| Published: |
1998
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1822/68734 |
| Country: | Portugal |
| Oai: | oai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/68734 |
| Summary: | This paper presents a formal framework in which to study the socialization processes evolving among utility-based agents. These agents are self-interested, being their different social attitudes (cooperativeness, competitiveness or indifference) a consequence of this behavior. The dynamics of the socialization process are captured by a relation that measures the similarities between the desires of two groups of agents. This similitude relation is derived from the system's model, defined as a probabilistic transition system and a set of individual preference relations. Game-theoretic concepts are used in order to determine the rational(or expected) transitions of the system. |
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