Hospital competition with soft budgets
We study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effort when their budgets are soft, i.e., the payer may cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. The basic set up is a Hotelling model with two hospitals that differ in location and face demand uncertainty, where the ho...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Outros Autores: | , |
| Formato: | workingPaper |
| Idioma: | eng |
| Publicado em: |
2012
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| Assuntos: | |
| Texto completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/1822/18522 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Oai: | oai:repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt:1822/18522 |