| Summary: | Discrete Modulation Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution (DM-CV-QKD) systems are very attractive for modern quantum cryptography, since they manage to surpass all Gaussian modulation (GM) system’s disadvantages while maintaining the advantages of using CVs. Nonetheless, DM-CV-QKD is still underdeveloped, with a very limited study of large constellations. This work intends to increase the knowledge on DM-CV-QKD systems considering large constellations, namely M-symbol Amplitude Phase Shift Keying (M-APSK) irregular and regular constellations. As such, a complete DM-CV-QKD system was implemented, con sidering collective attacks and reverse reconciliation under the realistic scenario, assuming Bob detains the knowledge of his detector’s noise. Tight security bounds were obtained considering M-APSK constellations and GM, both for the mutual information between Bob and Alice and the Holevo bound between Bob and Eve. M-APSK constellations with binomial distribution can approximate GM’s results for the secret key rate. Without the consideration of the finite size effects (FSEs), the regular constellation 256-APSK (reg. 32) with binomial distribution achieves 242.9 km, only less 7.2 km than GM for a secret key rate of 10¯⁶ photons per symbol. Considering FSEs, 256-APSK (reg. 32) achieves 96.4% of GM’s maximum transmission distance (2.3 times more than 4-PSK), and 78.4% of GM’s maximum compatible excess noise (10.2 times more than 4-PSK). Additionally, larger constellations allow the use of higher values of modulation variance in a practical implementation, i.e., we are no longer subjected to the sub-one limit for the mean number of photons per symbol. The information reconciliation step considering a binary symmetric channel, the sum-product algorithm and multi-edge type low den sity parity check matrices, constructed from the progressive edge growth algorithm, allowed the correction of keys up to 18 km. The consideration of multidimensional reconciliation allows 256-APSK (reg. 32) to reconcile keys up to 55 km. Privacy amplification was carried out considering the application of fast Fourier transforms to the Toeplitz extractor, being unable of extracting keys for more than, approximately, 49 km, almost haft the theoretical value, and for excess noises larger than 0.16 SNU, like the theoretical value.
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