| Summary: | A Hotelling-type model of spatial competition is considered, in which two firms compete in uniform delivered prices. First, it is shown that there exists no uniform delivered price–location equilibrium when the product sold by the firms is perfectly homogeneous and when consumers buy from the firm quoting the lower delivered price. Second, when the product is heterogeneous and when preferences are identically, independently Weibull-distributed with standard deviation μ, we prove that there exists a single uniform delivered price–location equilibrium if μ≧1/8 times the transportation rate times the size of the market. In equilibrium, firms are located at the center of the market and charge the same uniform delivered price, which equals their average transportation cost, plus a mark-up of 2μ. Finally, we discuss how our result extends to the case of n firms and proceed to a comparison of equilibria under uniform mill and delivered pricing.
|
|---|