Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ferreira, Fernanda A. (author)
Other Authors: Ferreira, Flávio (author)
Format: conferenceObject
Language:eng
Published: 2014
Subjects:
Industrial organization
Game theory
Oligopoly models
Uncertainty
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4396
Country:Portugal
Oai:oai:recipp.ipp.pt:10400.22/4396

Internet

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4396

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