Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown
We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price...
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| Formato: | conferenceObject |
| Idioma: | eng |
| Publicado em: |
2014
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| Texto completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4396 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Oai: | oai:recipp.ipp.pt:10400.22/4396 |
| Resumo: | We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit. |
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