Uncertainty in a mixed duopoly with quadratic costs
In this paper, we consider a mixed market with uncertain demand, involving one private firm and one public firm with quadratic costs. The model is a two-stage game in which players choose to make their output decisions either in stage 1 or stage 2. We assume that the demand is unknown until the end of...
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| Formato: | conferenceObject |
| Idioma: | eng |
| Publicado em: |
2014
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| Texto completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4884 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Oai: | oai:recipp.ipp.pt:10400.22/4884 |
| Resumo: | In this paper, we consider a mixed market with uncertain demand, involving one private firm and one public firm with quadratic costs. The model is a two-stage game in which players choose to make their output decisions either in stage 1 or stage 2. We assume that the demand is unknown until the end of the first stage. We compute the output levels at equilibrium in each possible role. We also determine ex-ante and ex-post firms’ payoff functions. |
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