Two-production-period in a duopoly with nonprofit and for-profit firms
We investigate endogenous roles in a competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, by allowing two production periods. We find that the Cournot-type equilibrium and one Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonprofit firm becomes the follower exist; however, ano...
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| Formato: | conferenceObject |
| Idioma: | eng |
| Publicado em: |
2014
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| Texto completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/4387 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Oai: | oai:recipp.ipp.pt:10400.22/4387 |
| Resumo: | We investigate endogenous roles in a competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, by allowing two production periods. We find that the Cournot-type equilibrium and one Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonprofit firm becomes the follower exist; however, another tackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonprofit firm becomes the leader does not exist. |
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