Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model
In this paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a two-part tariff. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the...
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| Format: | article |
| Language: | eng |
| Published: |
2014
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/3181 |
| Country: | Portugal |
| Oai: | oai:recipp.ipp.pt:10400.22/3181 |
| Summary: | In this paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a two-part tariff. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results. We also do a direct comparison between our model and Cournot duopoly model. |
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